Did the CIA pressure Yemen to release al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki?
More evidence of CIA support for al-Qaeda exposed.
Explosive new recordings released by the Houthi government of Yemen pile more earth atop mountains of existing evidence of the U.S. government’s support for the very same terrorists it has claimed to be waging war against for nearly two decades.
The Moral Guidance Department, a branch of the Yemeni Armed Forces of the revolutionary Houthi government of Yemen published last week a number of secret documents and phone calls from the former regime of longtime president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Two phone calls between former president Saleh and the former director of the CIA George Tenet were released. A Yemeni government official has confirmed to me that the calls took place in 2001.
In the calls, the former CIA director can be heard pressuring Saleh to release a detained individual involved in the bombing attacks on USS Cole in October of 2000, which left 17 dead and 37 injured.
In the call, Tenet is asked by Saleh’s translator about the name of the individual in question.
“I don’t want to give his name over the phone,” Tenet tells him.
Saleh notes that the FBI team tasked with the USS Cole investigation had already arrived in Sana’a, and asks Tenet if the FBI personnel could meet with him to discuss the matter. Tenet refuses, saying “this is my person, this is my problem, this is my issue... The man must be released.”
“I’ve talked to everybody in my government; I told them that I was going to make this call,” Tenet says.
As Saleh’s translator is delivering Tenet’s message to the president, the CIA director cuts him off and says that the man in question “must be released within 48 hours.”
“After 50 days, this must stop,” he says.
Major General Abdul Qadir al-Shami, the deputy-head of the Yemeni Security and Intelligence Service, confirmed to Houthi media that the person in question was dual American-Yemeni citizen imam Anwar Al-Awlaki, a top leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who was killed in Yemen in 2011 by a CIA drone strike.
Houthi media says al-Shami “pointed out that the Americans used to train their individuals in Yemen and send them abroad to carry out operations for them, and then affix the accusation to Yemen as an excuse to come under the cover of fighting those individuals.”
Another document from the State Department dated 1998 highly suggests US interests in establishing a military presence in Yemen around the sea of Aden.
Saudi-born Ali al-Ahmed of the Gulf Institute, a leading expert on Saudi politics and terrorism, told me that he is not at all surprised by the phone call between George Tenet and Yemen’s former president.
“I’ve been saying this for a long time,” al-Ahmed told me. “People that think that these organizations; al-Qaeda, ISIS, are organic, non-state-backed organizations are either lying or are completely stupid. The fact that ISIS had all these American weapons, they didn’t come from thin air. This was part of a plan. The same thing with al-Qaeda; the fact that this organization which has been attacked all over the world continues to survive 20 years on, and spread, it’s not by accident. It’s done by security and intelligence organizations in Washington, D.C. and in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and by Ali Abdullah Saleh.”
“This recording,” he said, “fits the bill; that Anwar al-Awlaki and others, they were sometimes knowingly or unknown being used as a tool.”
The Tenets of Tenet
George Tenet is the second-longest serving director of the CIA. Originally brought in to the post by Bill Clinton, he oversaw the Bush administration’s response to the September 11 attacks.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, after Tenet asked for the Saudi’s help with Osama bin Laden prior to the attacks, the Saudi’s response was so encouraging that Clinton made Tenet “his informal personal representative to work with the Saudis on terrorism,” which included at least two trips to Riyadh.
Following the 9/11 attacks, Tenet authorized the CIA’s use of waterboarding and other torture methods.
Tenet told 9/11 investigators that he had not met with President Bush in the month prior to the attacks, but was later corrected by a CIA spokesman that same evening, who said he did.
A CIA Inspector General inquiry accused Tenet of failing to do enough to prevent the attacks, saying "by virtue of his position, [Tenet] bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created” despite the CIA knowing of the dangers presented by al-Qaeda.
“Many of the difficulties that were listed in that report today - the inability to share information, the lack of people to support and run operations against Osama bin Laden - those were problems that were brought to Mr. Tenet's attention as early as 1996 and he never did anything about them," Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's Osama bin Laden unit, told the BBC.
Tenet was “too busy schmoozing with foreign leaders… that he forgot that his job was to manage the intelligence community,” former CIA analyst Ray McGovern has said.
According to journalist Bob Woodward, who interviewed George Bush himself for his book “Plan of Attack,” Tenet and his deputy presented the president with satellite footage purported to show weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Unimpressed, Bush asked whether “this is the best we’ve got?” Tenet then leapt from the couch, raised his arms, and told the president it was a “slam dunk!”
When Bush challenged him again, Tenet repeated “The case, it's a slam dunk.”
According to Woodward: “I asked the president about this and he said it was very important to have the CIA director – 'Slam-dunk is as I interpreted is a sure thing, guaranteed. No possibility it won't go through the hoop.' Others present; Cheney, very impressed."
Hijinks with the Hijackers
Anwar al-Awlaki has been perhaps the most enigmatic figure in the so-called War on Terror; even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, al-Awlaki enjoyed free travel between Western countries like the United States and the United Kingdom and Yemen. He was killed in a CIA drone strike in Yemen in 2011, a likely-illegal targeted killing of an American citizen with little to no precedent.
Al-Awlaki’s name has appeared in connection with a plethora of terrorist attacks against Western targets and, in addition to the now apparent ties to US intelligence, had held relationships with suspected Saudi intelligence officers.
Anwar al-Awlaki would, according to a fellow student at Colorado State, spend his off time in the summer training with the US-funded and equipped Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the precursor of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. The Afghan militants were funnelled $20 billion by the CIA in Operation Cyclone, with Osama Bin Laden being a main benefactor, in order to fight off the Soviets defending the then-socialist government.
By 1996, al-Awlaki was recruiting Muslims in the United States to take up arms in foreign lands as he encouraged a young Saudi student to “to travel to Chechnya to join the jihad against the Russians.” He did, and was killed in fighting in 1999.
Though the record holds many discrepancies, al-Awlaki’s place of birth is said to be in New Mexico. Conservative journalist Paul Sperry writes in his book, “federal law enforcement records I have obtained indicate that he was born in Aden, Yemen, on April 21, 1971, and first came to the U.S. as a Yemeni citizen on a J-1 research-scholar visa on June 5, 1990." Meanwhile, “a search of state vital records in New Mexico turns up no birth certificate."
Al-Awlaki’s now-revealed status as a CIA asset may help explain this discrepancy and how — if it’s true that al-Awlaki was not born in the U.S. — he wound up with citizenship.
Nasser al-Awlaki, Anwar’s father, was a Fulbright Scholar who studied in New Mexico and later worked for the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Anwar Al-Awlaki moved from Denver to San Diego and became the Imam at the Masjid Ar-Ribat al-Islami mosque. There, he held court with Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Hani Hanjour, all three of whom would go on to hijack the planes that crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11.
According to the 9/11 Commission report, Hanjour’s older brother claimed Hani had gone to Afghanistan “in the late 1980’s, as a teenager, to participate in the jihad and, because the Soviets had already withdrawn, worked for a relief agency there.”
Even Ali al-Ahmed, a leading critic of Saudi Arabia, says the propaganda campaign promoting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan deluded him when he was very young. “It was part of a plan,” he said.
Meanwhile, Hazmi and Mihdhar had joined up with the Bosnian Mujahideen following the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia, a conflict which saw the Clinton administration and the Pentagon oversee clandestine foreign arms shipments Islamists fighting in the dirty war. Hazmi and Mihdhar were even granted Bosnian citizenship to fight there. Al-Qaeda operative and “principle architect of the 9/11 attacks'' according to the 9/11 Comission Report, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, had “also spent time fighting alongside the mujahideen in Bosnia and supporting that effort with financial donations.”
As I have previously reported, the Brooklyn-based Al-Kifah Afghan Refugee Center, “a front for Maktab al-Khidamat, an organization co-founded by Osama bin Laden” was used by the CIA in Operation Cyclone to send young American Muslims to fight in Afghanistan, and continued to be used by the Clinton administration to recruit young fighters to the war in Bosnia.
“The Bosnian War drew extremists of all types from all over the world. The El Mujahid, the unit of foreign mujahideen fighters in Bosnia, videotaped themselves committing war crimes against Serbs including beheadings and torture,” Lily Lynch, co-founder and editor-in-chief of Balkanist Magazine, told me. “There are also reports that the mujahideen terrorized the local Bosniak population by making aid contingent upon radical conversion.”
“Unfortunately, much of the discussion of the crimes committed by El Mujahid in Bosnia has been led by Islamophobes with a wider political agenda, usually anti-immigration,” she continued. “This has prevented an honest and complete coming to terms with the crimes of the past, including those very real and documented crimes committed by the mujahideen.”
Al-Awlaki was under investigation by the FBI in 1999 and 2000 after they learned he "may have been contacted by a possible procurement agent for Osama Bin Laden,” according to the 9/11 Comission Report. Additionally, al-Awlaki had “been visited by Ziyad Khaleel, an al-Qaeda operative who purchased a battery for Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone, as well as by an associate of Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called blind Shaykh.”
Around this period of time, al-Awlaki was the vice-president of the Charitable Society for Social Welfare, a money-funneling front for al-Qaeda.
One contact of al-Awlaki’s in San Diego was Omar al-Bayoumi, who introduced al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to him. Al-Bayoumi was presented in the 9/11 Commission Report as a “good Samaritan,” according to mainstream media reports, who wanted to help fellow Saudis al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, who had previously been surveilled by three governments at the request of the CIA before showing up in San Diego.
However, the “28 pages” of the congressional “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11” that had long been withheld from the U.S. public until they were declassified 13 years later following lobbying by victims of the terrorist attacks, strongly indicate that al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence officer. Additionally, former US intelligence official Richard Clarke has speculated that he was also a CIA asset. The 28 pages note that the “FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi has ties to terrorist elements as well.”
Al-Bayoumi, who was on the payroll of the Saudi monarchy via a third party company, set up al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with an apartment. That very same day, four phone calls took place between al-Bayoumi and al-Awlaki.
Another “close associate” of al-Bayoumi and yet another suspected Saudi intelligence officer — and friend of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi — Osama Basnan, had been investigated by the FBI in 1993 for his support for Osama Bin Laden, contacts with the Bin Laden family, and holding a party in 1992 for the Blind Shaykh, another Afghan Mujahideen figure who worked with the CIA and Osama Bin Laden. The Blind Shaykh died in prison in 2017 for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.
Money sent to Basnan from members of the Saudi Royal Family had made its way into al-Bayoumi’s pockets. The two had called each other “roughly 700 times” over the period of one year. Basnan would later brag that he did more to help the 9/11 hijackers than al-Bayoumi to an FBI asset.
News reports from 2003 note how “FBI officials continue to downplay any possible culpability on the part of Omar al-Bayoumi, Anwar Al-Awlaki or Osama Basnan.” Al-Bayoumi and Basnan’s extremism wasn’t acknowledged by US authorities until the long-withheld 28 pages were released in 2016.
During al-Awlaki’s time in San Diego, when he wasn’t getting busted for trying to pick up prostitutes or starting failed business ventures, he held frequent, closed-door meetings with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar until he went on what he told reporters was a “sabbatical” through “several countries” in 2000, the year that the USS Cole was bombed.
Some time the following year, al-Awlaki resettled just outside Falls Church, Virginia, and became the imam at a local mosque. He was followed by the three hijackers: Hanjour, al-Hazmi, and al-Mihdhar, and an associate of his set them up with an apartment in Alexandria. Additionally, one accused key planner of the 9/11 attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the so-called “20th hijacker” currently held in Guantanamo Bay, had al-Awlaki’s phone number in his personal contact list when his apartment was raided in the days following the attacks.
Freedom of Information Act requests have furnished the public with under-reported documents showing when the FBI investigated al-Awlaki’s Visa transactions, an entry for “Atta, Mohammed -- American West Airlines, 08/13/2001, Washington, DC to Las Vegas to Miami” turned up. Mohammed Atta is widely described as the “ringleader” of the September 11 attacks.
The flight referenced was one of Atta’s so-called “surveillance flights.” Logs for flights of two more hijackers — one of the al-Shehri brothers and Satam al-Squami, also appear in the disclosed Visa investigation documents. The FBI has denied having evidence of al-Awlaki purchasing plane tickets for the hijackers.
By this time, al-Awlaki was becoming a somewhat prominent figure, with up to 3,000 people regularly showing up for his Friday services, and with CD box set lectures becoming popular. He went back briefly to San Diego in August 2001 and reportedly told a neighbor “I don’t think you’ll be seeing me… Later on you’ll find out why.”
One frequent attendee at al-Awlaki’s lectures was Gordon Snow, then-FBI Director of Counterintelligence for the Middle East. Snow had recently been “assigned to assessment, protection, and investigative support missions after the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.” Al-Awlaki was also around this time serving as the Muslim chaplain at D.C.’s George Washington University.
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, “al-Awlaki was one of Washington DC’s go-to Muslim sources, considered a moderate Islamic voice with positive views of the United States and the West who did not shy away from publicly condemning Islamist terrorism and the 9/11 attacks” according to a research paper published by the Homeland Security Digital Library. In highly-public remarks, he was condemning the attacks, but just days after he was giving comments to Islamic websites blaming Israel and claiming the FBI had placed the blame on any passenger on those flights with Muslim-sounding names.
Though it was then not known that al-Awlaki was the “spiritual leader” of some of the hijackers, the New York Times, National Public Radio, and the Washington Post among others, went to him as their default Muslim voice.
“I think that in general, Islam is presented in a negative way. I mean there’s always this association of Islam and terrorism when that is not true at all, I mean, Islam is a religion of peace” he told the Washington Post as they recorded him from the passenger seat of his car in November 2001. In a subsequent video, al-Awlaki downplays the crimes of the Taliban, saying “the US is kind of demonizing the Taliban, and it’s true, the Taliban have made a lot of mistakes in the past, but the Northern Alliance isn’t really any better.”
Around this time, al-Awlaki would become the first imam in history to conduct a prayer service in the U.S. Capitol. Between September 15, 2001 and September 19th, 2001, the FBI interviewed al-Awlaki four times according to FBI documents.
“The FBI told the 9/11 Commission and Congress that it did not have reason to detain Awlaki,” according to a later article by the Washington Post.
Within months of the attacks and following a vetting process, al-Awlaki was invited to a luncheon with military brass at the Pentagon as a “moderate Muslim” to hold dialogue with as part of move to reach out to Muslim community members.
Despite his support in high places, al-Awlaki left the United States in 2002 with the Falls Church mosque citing a “climate of fear and intimidation.”
He would spend the next years in the United Kingdom before returning to Yemen. But he made a stop back in the U.S. in 2002, flying in on a Saudi Arabia Airlines flight with a Saudi agent accompanying him at the connecting airport on his way to JFK, according to law enforcement documents obtained by Paul Sperry.
With an arrest warrant out on him for passport fraud, federal agents detained al-Awlaki upon his return. But a federal judge had rescinded the arrest warrant that very same day, allowing al-Awlaki to walk free.
He’d go back to northern Virginia and meet with Ali al-Timimi, a radical cleric who was later arrested for recruiting 11 Muslims to join the Taliban, to talk to him about getting young Muslims to take up jihad.
Even al-Timimi thought something was suspect, reportedly wondering “if Mr. Awlaki might be trying to entrap him at the FBI’s instigation,” according to his friends. Al-Awlaki left again on a Saudi flight without incident, however, Sperry claims, citing law enforcement documents, that he had another warrant out for his arrest based on an investigation against terrorism financing by the U.S. Treasury Department. That claim has been corroborated by government documents which reveal that FBI agent Wade Ammerman ordered that the warrant be bypassed.
By the time 9/11 Commission Investigators tried to interview al-Awlaki in 2003, they were unable to locate him, according to the report.
And yet, documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act reveal that al-Awlaki was exchanging emails and voice messages with an FBI agent that year. One document has an FBI agent writing to another “Holy crap, [redacted] isn't this your guy? The [imam] with the prostitutes.”
Another document has an FBI agent complaining of the 9/11 Commission’s “numerous and unrelenting” attempts to access al-Awlaki. Another memo dated within days of al-Awlaki’s return to the U.S. to meet with al-Timimi has al-Awlaki’s name in the subject line in addition to “Synopsis: Asset reporting.”
The Candide of Jihad
When al-Awlaki started preaching in London, his rhetoric took a decidedly more extremist turn with frequent denunciations of non-Muslims and calls for martyrdom. He would relocate to Yemen where he would lecture at a university in Sana’a run by Sheik Abd-al-Majid al-Zindini, who was later designated a terrorist by the U.S. and fought with Osama bin Laden, with U.S. support during Operation Cyclone in Afghanistan.
In 2006, al-Awlaki was arrested again in Yemen for participating in a al-Qaeda plot to kidnap a U.S. military attaché and a Shia teenager. FBI agents would interview him in prison about the 9/11 attacks. After a while, some U.S. officials were “disturbed at the imprisonment without charge of a United States citizen” and “signaled that they no longer insisted on Mr Awlaki’s incarceration, and he was released,” according to the New York Times.
Following his release in Yemen, al-Awlaki started his own website and his far-reaching online rhetoric became even more extremist and supportive of attacks against the United States. He also started being featured in videos published by al-Qaeda itself and has been dubbed the “bin Laden of the internet.”
His name would begin to increasingly surface in connection to high-profile terrorist attacks on Western targets: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, the perpetrator of a drive-by shooting on a US military recruiting office in Arkansas, claimed to be dispatched by AQAP and carried al-Awlaki’s literature; Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 and injured 30 at Fort Hood, had attended al-Awlaki’s lectures at the Falls Church mosque and exchanged up to 20 emails with him leading up to his attack (al-Awlaki later described Hasan as a “hero”); Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed “underwear bomber,” is believed to have met with him weeks prior in Yemen; a New Jersey man by the name of Sharif Mobley who killed a Yemeni hospital guard after he was captured in a raid against al-Qaeda had made contact with al-Awlaki and went to Yemen to seek him out; and the 2010 attempted Times Square bomber had contact with him.
A full list of all the people arrested for trying to support al-Qaeda who had contact with al-Awlaki, or those who attempted to carry out terrorist attacks who were inspired by al-Awlaki, would be too long for this article. “Al-Awlaki's sermons and recordings have been found on the computers of at least a dozen of [sic] terror suspects in the U.S. and Britain,” CNN reported in 2010. Al-Awlaki is considered to have helped inspire the Boston Marathon bombing, the 2015 attack in San Bernardino, California, and the shooting at the Orlando Pulse Nightclub.
In 2010, al-Awlaki was placed on the U.S. kill list, he then made his way onto the Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, and then the United Nation Security Council’s list of individuals associated with al-Qaeda.
The following year, the CIA finally liquidated its own former asset with a drone strike.
“The death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al-Qaeda's most active operational affiliate. He took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans,” President Obama said at the time.
Two weeks after the killing of al-Awlaki, another drone strike ordered by Obama killed Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, Anwar’s American-born 16-year-old son. Six years later, President Trump ordered a raid that killed Nawar al-Awlaki, the eight-year-old daughter of Anwar.
Best Frenemies Forever
Yemen has suffered six years of devastating war since revolutionary Houthi forces took over the capital in September of 2014 from then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the former vice president of longtime ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is widely considered to be a puppet of Saudi Arabia. The war was exacerbated by the introduction of foreign forces and foreign air power to the conflict, most notably by the Saudi-led coalition’s entry on March 25th, 2015.
Six years on, the war has produced what experts have been calling the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world, with the United Nations estimating that 80 percent of the Yemeni population in severe need of humanitarian assistance including 12 million children.
While the U.S. has repeatedly pounded AQAP in Yemen with bombs, they are not entirely enemies. The Saudi coalition, which the U.S. is a part of, is at war with the revolutionary Houthi government, and therefore shares a purpose in the country with al-Qaeda: expelling the Houthis from power.
“The coalition cut secret deals with al-Qaeda fighters, paying some to leave key cities and towns and letting others retreat with weapons, equipment and wads of looted cash,” the Associated Press reported in 2018. “Hundreds more were recruited to join the coalition itself.”
“Key participants in the pacts said the U.S. was aware of the arrangements and held off on any drone strikes,” according to AP. In fact, the coalition actively recruits them because they are considered formidable on the battlefield, the outlet says before continuing to detail al-Qaeda figures playing key roles in major militias backed by the United Arab Emirates, another coalition partner.
And since the U.S. has sent billions of dollars in weapons to the coalition to fight the Houthis, it should come as little shock that al-Qaeda militias are parading around Yemeni city streets in U.S.-made MRAP armored vehicles.
Saudi expert Ali Al-Ahmed told me that the U.S. can justify its presence in Yemen by supporting al-Qaeda and then saying that AQAP is a great threat to America.
He said the “idea that Muslims are our enemies, we need to bring them down, take their wealth and keep them fighting each other” was started by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the architect of Operation Cyclone, but was mainly supported in the beginning by Qatar.
He added: “they even had to overthrow the government of Pakistan to get this policy through. They made Pakistan into this arm to carry out this thing with Brzezinski.”
“Al-Qaeda and ISIS would not survive without state support, including the U.S., and they do it because it serves their interests. Not the interests of the U.S., but of those in power and the companies that make money off this,” he said.
Al-Ahmed describes al-Qaeda as a useful tool for U.S. intelligence and other actors to achieve their geopolitical goals. He tells me a story of a Jordanian carpenter who was pressured and bribed to join al-Qaeda in their effort in Syria against the government of Bashar Assad, with American, British, and Jordanian intelligence officers offering him whatever he wanted to go.
He didn’t want to go, and so they threatened him. Eventually, al-Ahmed describes, he went, came back and was quickly “taken out” upon his return.
“Al-Qaeda is like a whore, and everybody is sleeping with that whore,” al-Ahmed said.
Rune Agerhus, co-founder of the Yemen Solidarity Council, contributed to this report.
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Outstanding article. One minor correction regarding: "However, the '28 pages' that had been left out of the 9/11 Commission Report..."
The 28 pages were not from the 9/11 Commission report, but rather from the earlier report of a joint congressional intelligence inquiry into 9/11. https://28pages.org/faq/
The link to the FBI documents released regarding the FBI and Awlaki. http://www.scribd.com/doc/118853482/FBI-Files.
It seems Fox was the only news site reporting. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/04/fbi-refutes-claims-it-suspected-al-awlaki-role-in-purchasing-11-hijackers/?test=latestnews
***in the docs themselves, page 49 for the credit card and plane tixx of the 3 hijackers Atta, Suqami, and al-Sheri. Note the date of the report was 9/27/01. In my opinion at this point, Awlaki could have been arrested. Frankly, we have held some at GTMO for a decade on lesser charges. Yet he was released.
**I'd also note page 152 of the FBI docs that mentions that Awlaki was detained at JFK airport in Oct 02 for passport fraud and then released. FoxNews reported this, as well. I went very into the weeds on this. Long story short, there's no sound reason the warrant should have been pulled. It was solid.
***then this reporting that Awlaki dined at the Pentagon in Feb 02 which is frankly just plain weird knowing that at the very same time the FBI was allegedly trying to figure out a way to arrest the guy. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/07/radical-muslim-clerics-pentagon-lunch-top-dod-lawyers-executive-director-cair/
***for more on Awlaki page 178 of the JICI. https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf.
Awlaki had contacts with al-Midhar, al-Hazmi, Hanjour, and Ramzi Bin-Alshibh.
And specifically to page 179 of the JICI, "The FBI closed its inquiry into the activities of the imam in March 2000, approximately 2 months after al-Hazmi and al-Midhar arrived in San Diego. In the case closing memorandum, the agent asserted that the imam had been 'fully identified and does not meet the criterion for further investigation.' The investigation was closed despite the imam's contacts with other subjects of counterterrorism investigations and reports concerning the imam's connection to suspect organizations." (Mentioning obviously the charities)
***for the 9/11 commission on Awlaki see pages 221, 229 and 519 footnote 33. Also note that Zelikow the former staff director commented that he felt they weren't able to fully investigate awlaki. Incidentally, the JICI says the same thing--"there's a lot of smoke there regarding awlaki"
***it's reported that page 49 of the judicial watch docs regarding the plane tickets was not given to the JICI or the 9/11 commission. There was a mandate for FBI to provide all material to both those investigative bodies, just fyi.
***regarding page 49 of docs(the possible plane tixx) the FBI is denying that the document speaks to any connection between awlaki and the hijackers. They claim that the document is being misinterpreted and that the redacted portion of the document explains why there is no connection.
***i should note that out of the 200 pages of the recently foia'd docs dumped by judicial watch, you can find facts that contradict the FBI's official timeline of the hijackers (found here in 3 parts: http://vault.fbi.gov/search?SearchableText=9%2F11+chronology).
***You also can discern that Awlaki and Atta might have traveled together on at least 2 occasions.
***Finally, you will discover that Awlaki actually had a flight from chicago to dulles on the morning of 9/11. His plane landed around 9am. Again, one would have thought that alone would have raised some flags.
-------------
Some questions:
Why was Awlaki not arrested and sent to GTMO? As I said above, we've held others for far less--particularly in the time-frame immediately after the 9/11 attacks. We rounded up everyone.
Why did the FBI fail to apply for any warrant ever on awlaki particularly when it is quite evident as early as 9/17/01 that Awlaki was making false statements to the FBI regarding his contacts and knowledge of the hijackers--Hamzi in particular.
Why was the FBI investigation of him closed in March 2000--at the precise time that Hamzi and alMidhar enter the country and meet Awlaki in San Diego? And when Awlaki was identified by FBI in March 2000 "what" was he identified as? A CI? An asset? If so, for whom?
When permitted to re-enter the US in October of 02, why did the FBI not question or at least detain Awlaki? He was apparently fairly available in the DC area since he showed up at the home of a known jihadist named Timimmi. Interestingly, Timmimi currently claims that Awlaki was wearing a wire and that he was trying to entrap him when he showed up at his residence in Oct 02.
****
Essentially, you've got a guy who was already being investigated by the FBI in 1999-2000 as being an al qaeda associate and also a consumer of prostitution.
Yet, in March 2000, FBI drops their investigation and Awlaki is "identified." Again, this investigation is dropped at the exact time that al-mihdhar and al hazmi arrive to san diego and meet Awlaki.
Also, recall that this information(that 2 known alqaeda who had just attended a terrorist summit in malaysia, were now inside the US) was admittedly and wrongfully withheld by the CIA from the FBI for nearly 18 months.
The USS Cole bombing occurs in Oct 2000. Awlaki has contacts with those involved with the Cole. Nothing happens.
Then Awlaki moves to Falls Church, Va. Soon after other hijackers(5 in total) relocate to Falls Church and it is discovered that Awlaki receives phone calls from Ramsi Binalshibh from the Hamburg cell--a well-known al Qaeda player.
It should be noted that as of August 15, 2001 Bin Alshibh has discussed the specific date and target of the attacks with Atta over the phone.
It was confirmed by the FBI yesterday that they had all the financials of the hijackers immediately (within hours) after the 9/11 attacks. From the foia'd docs you can see that they ran financials on Awlaki, as well. Once given access to the financials, it is impossible for the FBI to not see the connection between Awlaki and Hamzi--on both the east and west coasts. Yet nothing happens. They also would have discovered that Awlaki flew on the morning of 9/11.
And then finally a DOS warrant is applied for and granted in june 02 for passport fraud. The warrant is inexplicably pulled four months later in oct 02 exactly one day prior to Awlaki's return to the US. The FBI agent involved in the pulling of the warrant is Wade Ammerman--the same FBI agent who handles the Timimmi case. Its doubtful Ammerman would have had the juice to pull such a warrant. Someone else must have called the us atty in colorado. Who was this person?
Days thereafter, Awlaki departs the US and goes on to be one of the most celebrated jihadists for almost a decade. He has links to the underwear bomber, the times square bomber, the paintball terrorists(timmimi), and the ft hood shooter, just to name a few. Interestingly, all of these attempts but for ft hood are thwarted, the assailants are caught, and Awlaki continues to evade capture.
When you read DOJ memo's and charges against these guys it's almost laughable; they all come across as low-level incompetent wannabes.
For example, the underwear bomber decides he wants to participate in jihad. He flies to Yemen and randomly starts asking around if anyone knows Awlaki. Finally, he is approached and given Awlaki's phone number. Awlaki actually answers the phone(which is sort of unbelievable given the broad knowledge and understanding regarding the US's surveillance abilities--particularly inside of Yemen--yet Awlaki (the world's number 2 terrorist at the time is available by phone and text). Awlaki talks by phone and then tells the kid to put why he wants to kill Americans in writing and then send it to him via txt. The kid does it. And then Awlaki goes on to the congratulate him for his commitment to jihad, sets him up with a bombmaker and gives the only instruction that he detonate the bomb over US airspace on an American plane(convenient). Of course, the bomb fails to ignite, the kid gets caught. And I'll wager a bet that the txt message specifically describing why he wants to kill Americans was used against him by the prosecution. www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/justice-department-memo-on-al-aulaqi-and-abdulmutallab/
Eventually in 2011, Awlaki gets sacked by an Obama drone. This drone strike is currently the topic of much debate surrounding the degree of secrecy of the evidence supporting said strike and the abuse of executive office in carrying out such an assasination of a US citizen and his 16 year old son.
I don't know, it all seems very strange to me.
Bottom line: I think Awlaki was a CI/asset. Run through either JSOC or a liaison service. I think that the evidence tends to implicate CIA as opposed to the FBI. For some reason, I don't think FBI was getting fed by this guy(well, at least not before 9/11), rather I think they were getting duped by him. CIA and their friends pre and post 9/11? In my opinion, that's probably a whole different story. But its a story that would at least explain why we had no terrorist attacks for the decade after 9/11--except obviously for FT hood. It might also explain why this guy was linked to virtually every terrorist attack attempt since 9/11.
Think about it--he runs an online jihad website. Gives speeches. Entices anyone who is interested. They reach out to him via email, txt, or telephone. He encourages them, has them put their desire in writing, provides equipment(that apparently always turns out to be defective), instructs that it has to be inside the US and then the jihadist is caught, the plot thwarted, and our intel guys look like heroes. Its also interesting to note that Bin laden never talked about Awlaki nor seemed to trust him.
Like I said, it all seems a bit weird--unless of course if he was an asset.